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Asymmetric Information and Intermediation Chains†
By Vincent Glode and Christian Opp*
We propose a parsimonious model of bilateral trade under asym-
metric information to shed light on the prevalence of intermediation 
chains that stand between buyers and sellers in many decentral-
ized markets. Our model features a classic problem in economics 
where an agent uses his market power to inefficiently screen a pri-
vately informed counterparty. Paradoxically, involving moderately 
informed intermediaries also endowed with market power can 
improve trade efficiency. Long intermediation chains in which each 
trader’s information set is similar to those of his direct counterpar-
ties limit traders’ incentives to post prices that reduce trade volume 
and jeopardize gains to trade. (JEL D42, D82, D85, L12, L14)
Transactions in decentralized markets often feature the successive involve-
ment of multiple intermediaries. In this paper, we propose a parsimonious model 
of bilateral trade to study the implications of these types of arrangements in the 
presence of asymmetric information. Our model initially considers two asym-
metrically informed agents who wish to trade an asset in order to realize gains 
to trade. One agent has market power in pricing the asset, whereas his counter-
party is privately informed about the value of the asset. A standard result in mod-
els like ours is that trade breaks down with positive probability when the potential 
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gains to trade are small relative to the underlying information asymmetry—rent 
seeking via socially inefficient screening reduces the expected surplus from 
trade.
Yet we show that involving a moderately informed intermediary, whose informa-
tion quality ranks between the buyer’s and the seller’s, can improve efficiency. By 
layering trade over two sequential transactions rather than one, this form of inter-
mediation may better incentivize efficient trading behavior by all agents involved. 
The benefits of a moderately informed intermediary further extend to settings where 
several intermediaries trade an asset sequentially, as part of an intermediation chain 
in which each trader’s information set is similar, although not identical, to those of 
his direct counterparties. Thus, in contrast to other theories that highlight the ben-
efits of a single intermediary, our analysis provides a rationale for why assets may 
be traded through long intermediation chains rather than through simpler networks 
centered around one dominant broker.
Below we provide a simple example aimed at illustrating the intuition behind our 
main results.
Illustrative Example.—The monopolist seller of an asset (or good) must choose 
the price he will quote to a potential buyer (or customer) as a  take-it-or-leave-it 
offer. The seller is, however, uncertain about how much the buyer is willing to pay 
for the asset. In particular, the seller only knows that the buyer’s valuation of the 
asset, which we denote by  v , has a uniform distribution:  v ∼ U [1, 2] . The buyer only 
accepts to pay a price  p if  v ≥ p ; otherwise, the seller must retain the asset, which 
for now, is assumed to be worth a constant value  c < 1 to him. The seller’s optimi-
zation problem can then be summarized as follows:
(1)  max 
p∈[1, 2] 
  Π ( p) =  Pr   
 (v ≥ p) p +  Pr   
 (v < p) c =  (2 − p) p +  ( p − 1) c. 
Concavity of  Π ( · ) implies that when  Π′(1) = c ≤ 0 , the seller quotes a price  p = 1 , 
which is always accepted by the buyer. Thus, trade occurs with probability  1 if and 
only if  c ≤ 0 , which is the socially efficient outcome since the buyer always val-
ues the asset more than the seller. However, if the seller’s valuation of the asset is 
c > 0 , the seller finds it optimal to quote  p > 1 and use his market power to screen 
the privately informed buyer, inefficiently destroying gains to trade with positive 
probability.
Now suppose that we involve an intermediary who, like the seller, only values the 
asset at  c . Given this private valuation, the intermediary only helps realize gains to 
trade if he resells the asset to the buyer. What may facilitate allocative efficiency is 
the fact that this intermediary is assumed to be moderately informed, in the sense 
that he obtains a signal indicating whether  v ∈ [1, 1.5) or  v ∈ [1.5, 2] , that is, the 
signal pools either  above-median or  below-median realizations of the buyer’s valu-
ation of the asset. The intermediary is thus better informed than the original seller, 
but less informed than the buyer. The seller first quotes a price to the intermediary. If 
the intermediary accepts to pay this price and obtains the asset he then quotes a price 
to the buyer. Using backward induction, we show that trade may now be efficient 
even when  c > 0 .
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Conditional on holding the asset and knowing that  v < 1.5 , the intermediary’s 
optimization problem when quoting a price to the buyer is
(2)  max 
p∈[1, 1.5) 
  Pr   
 (v ≥ p | v < 1.5) p +  Pr   
 (v < p | v < 1.5) c =  ( 1.5 − p _0.5 ) p +  ( p − 1 _0.5 ) c. 
The  first-order condition of this problem implies that the seller quotes a socially 
efficient price  p = 1 if and only if  c ≤ 0.5 . Similarly, conditional on holding the 
asset and knowing that  v ≥ 1.5 , the intermediary’s optimization problem can be 
written as
(3)  max 
p∈[1.5, 2] 
  Pr   
 (v ≥ p | v ≥ 1.5) p +  Pr   
 (v < p | v ≥ 1.5) c =  ( 2 − p _0.5 ) p +  ( p − 1.5 _0.5 ) c. 
Here, the  first-order condition implies that the seller quotes a socially efficient price 
p = 1.5 if and only if  c ≤ 1 . Overall, the intermediary thus always quotes a socially 
efficient price as long as  c ≤ min {0.5, 1} = 0.5 .
Now, consider the seller’s problem provided that this condition is satisfied 
( c ≤ 0.5 ) and the seller anticipates that trade between the intermediary and the 
buyer will be efficient. Facing the intermediary, the seller then optimally chooses 
between quoting a price  p = 1 , which is always accepted, and a price  p = 1.5 , 
which the intermediary only accepts if he receives a signal that  v ≥ 1.5 . Thus, the 
seller chooses to quote a price  p = 1 rather than  p = 1.5 if and only if
(4)  1 ≥ 0.5 · 1.5 + 0.5 · c, 
which simplifies to  c ≤ 0.5. Together, these conditions imply that intermediated 
trade is efficient as long as  c ≤ 0.5 , whereas direct trade can only be efficient if 
c ≤ 0 .
It is helpful to interpret this result by considering the  trade-off between the proba-
bility of a sale and the payoff the seller collects conditional on a sale. The more dis-
persed the seller’s beliefs about the buyer’s valuation are, the less the seller reduces 
the probability of trade when increasing his price quote. A seller with more dispersed 
beliefs is thus more tempted to screen the buyer by quoting higher prices, while 
probabilistically destroying gains to trade. In the example above, without an inter-
mediary the seller reduces the probability of trade by  ε when inefficiently increasing 
his price quote by  ε . In contrast, the intermediary finds it less profitable to screen the 
buyer—given his better information and more concentrated beliefs, the intermediary 
reduces the probability of trade by  2ε when inefficiently increasing his price quote 
by  ε . Similarly, the original seller may find deviating from a socially efficient price 
less attractive when trading with the intermediary rather than directly with the buyer. 
Facing the intermediary, the seller’s beliefs about his counterparty’s valuation are 
concentrated at two points, corresponding to the two possible signal realizations that 
pool ranges of buyer types. A seller quoting a price that exceeds the intermediary’s 
valuation of the asset given a low signal, even just marginally, is then penalized by 
a large decline in the probability of trade. Overall, this simple example highlights 
how replacing one monopoly problem with a large information asymmetry by two 
sequential monopoly problems, each with less information asymmetry, may reduce 
incentives to screen counterparties, thereby increasing the social efficiency of trade.
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We explore these results in greater detail throughout the paper by generalizing 
our analysis along several dimensions. We allow for traders’ private information to 
relate to common and private value components. We also generalize our distribu-
tional assumptions on  v and how the intermediary’s information sets partition the 
distribution. Finally, we show how involving multiple intermediaries can further 
improve the efficiency of trade. In the example above, we can use similar argu-
ments to show that the condition for efficient trade is weakened to  c ≤ 0.67 if trade 
instead goes through a chain of two intermediaries: a first one who knows whether 
v ∈ [1, 1.67) or  v ∈ [1.67, 2] and a second one who knows whether  v ∈ [1, 1.33) , 
v ∈ [1.33, 1.67) , or  v ∈ [1.67, 2] .
When market power leads to inefficiencies, one might expect that adding layers 
of intermediation would reduce efficiency due to problems of double marginaliza-
tion (e.g., Spengler 1950). Our paper, however, shows that if intermediaries are par-
tially informed, the associated reduction in the incentives to screen throughout the 
intermediation chain can, somewhat paradoxically, improve efficiency. Moreover, if 
private information is sufficiently dispersed, longer chains of intermediaries may be 
needed to sustain efficient trade in each transaction. Greater information asymme-
tries thus require longer intermediation chains that involve many sequential transac-
tions, contrasting with the conventional wisdom that asymmetric information should 
be associated with low trading volume (as it is the case in the seminal model of 
Akerlof 1970). 
Related Literature.—Intermediation is known to facilitate trade, either by mini-
mizing transaction costs (Townsend 1978), by concentrating monitoring incentives 
(Diamond 1984), or by alleviating search frictions (Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1987; 
Yavas¸ 1994; Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen 2005; Neklyudov 2013). Our paper 
specifically speaks to how intermediaries may alleviate trading inefficiencies caused 
by asymmetric information and imperfect competition. We know from Myerson and 
Satterthwaite (1983) that an uninformed third party who subsidizes transactions 
can help eliminate problems of asymmetric information in bilateral trade. Trade 
efficiency can also be improved by the involvement of fully informed middlemen 
who care about their reputation (Biglaiser 1993) or who worry that informed buyers 
could force them to hold on to  low-quality goods (Li 1998). Contrary to these mod-
els, our setup considers the possibility that an intermediary’s information set differs 
from those of the other agents already involved in the transaction. In fact, in our 
static model without subsidies, warranties, or reputational concerns the involvement 
of an intermediary who is equally informed as either the buyer or the seller does not 
improve trade efficiency. Thus, the insight that involving moderately informed inter-
mediaries can help solve a standard problem in economics—when an agent uses his 
market power to inefficiently screen his trade partner—fundamentally differentiates 
our paper from these earlier papers.
Although intermediation chains can be observed in various settings (e.g., retail 
distribution networks), we rely on the recent empirical literature documenting the 
importance of  interdealer trading and intermediation chains in  over-the-counter 
(OTC) financial markets to contextualize our theory. According to the Bank for 
International Settlements (2013),  interdealer trading accounts for  35 percent of the 
$2.3 trillion in daily transaction volume for OTC  interest-rate derivatives. Goldstein 
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and Hotchkiss (2012) find that roughly one-third of transaction volume in secondary 
markets for newly issued corporate bonds is among dealers. For municipal bonds, 
Li and Schürhoff (2014) show that  13 percent of intermediated  round-trip trades 
involve a chain of 2 intermediaries and an additional  10 percent of trades involve 3 
or more intermediaries. Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt (2014) also provide evi-
dence of intermediation chains in the market for securitized products: for example, 
intermediated  round-trip trades of  non-agency collateralized mortgage obligations 
(CMO) involve 1.76 dealers on average and in some instances the chain includes up 
to 10 dealers.
Viswanathan and Wang (2004) propose an alternative explanation for the exis-
tence of intermediation chains in OTC markets.1 In their model, a security issuer 
may prefer a trading venue where dealers with heterogeneous inventory levels trade 
the security sequentially to a centralized auction that splits the supply of the secu-
rity among the dealers. Traders find it optimal to share inventory risk among them-
selves and, as a result, they resell only a fraction of their acquired position to their 
respective counterparty in the chain. Although we agree that inventory risk concerns 
are economically important in financial markets, these concerns cannot explain the 
existence of the particular chains that Li and Schürhoff (2014) document. Li and 
Schürhoff (2014) identify an intermediation chain in the municipal bond market 
only when a dealer buys and then sells the same quantity of a security to another 
dealer. Intermediation chains that split orders among dealers in order to share inven-
tory risk might still be prevalent in this market, but the specific chains that Li and 
Schürhoff (2014) document simply cannot be rationalized by  interdealer trading 
aimed at dispersing inventory through a network.
Related findings also lend support to our  information-based theory of interme-
diation chains. Intermediaries in our model are still averse to holding inventories 
(i.e.,  nonzero positions) since they are not the efficient holders of assets. Yet, infor-
mation asymmetries may prevent them from offloading assets to potential buyers, 
consistent with evidence in Jiang and Sun (2015) suggesting that the corporate bond 
market is affected by significant asymmetric information problems. Consistent with 
the mechanism at play in our model, Li and Schürhoff (2014) show that municipal 
bonds without credit ratings or with speculative ratings are typically traded through 
longer intermediation chains than municipal bonds with  investment-grade ratings, 
which arguably are less likely to be associated with large information asymmetries. 
Further, Di Maggio, Kermani, and Song (2015) find that average chain length in 
the corporate bond market increased following Lehman Brothers’ collapse, a time 
during which uncertainty and the potential for information asymmetries spiked.
More broadly, our paper can shed light on the observation by Adrian and Shin 
(2010, p. 604) that the whole US financial system shifted in recent decades from 
its traditional, centralized model of financial intermediation to a more complex, 
 market-based model characterized by “the long chain of financial intermediaries 
1 In contrast, Weller (2013) documents  high-frequency trading chains in metals futures markets and proposes a 
rationale for these particular chains that relies on heterogeneity in dealers’ technological ability to quickly transact 
in centralized trading venues. Evaluating the effects of  high-frequency trading, Jovanovic and Menkveld (2015) 
also consider a model with centralized trading but focus on the idea that limit orders can be adversely selected once 
new information arrives. They show theoretically and empirically that this type of adverse selection can be allevi-
ated by the entry of  high-frequency traders who refresh quotes frequently. 
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involved in channeling funds” (see also for similar characterizations, Kroszner and 
Melick 2009; Cetorelli, Mandel, and Mollineaux 2012; Pozsar et al. 2013).
Roadmap.—In the next section, we model a fairly standard bargaining problem 
between two asymmetrically informed traders. We analyze in Section II how involv-
ing a moderately informed intermediary can improve trade efficiency. In Section III, 
we extend our analysis to show how long chains of intermediaries may sustain 
efficient trade in cases where shorter chains do not. In Section IV, we discuss the 
implementation of this type of intermediation, and the last section concludes. Unless 
stated otherwise, proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
I. Direct Bilateral Trade
We initially consider two  risk-neutral agents who wish to trade one unit of an 
asset over the counter: a potential buyer who values the asset ex post at  v ∈ [ v L ,  v H ] 
and the current owner of the asset who values it at  c (v) . The function  c ( · ) is weakly 
increasing, continuous, and satisfies  c (v) < v for all  v ∈ [ v L ,  v H ] . The last condition 
implies that trade always creates a surplus and is therefore efficient if and only if 
the buyer obtains the asset with probability  1 .2 The cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) for the value  v , denoted by  F (v) , is continuous and differentiable and the 
probability density function (PDF), denoted by  f  (v) , takes strictly positive values 
everywhere on the support  [ v L ,  v H ] . The functions  c ( · ) and  F ( · ) are common knowl-
edge, but traders are asymmetrically informed about  v at the time of trade.
Although the role that intermediation plays in our model is relatively simple, 
 multilayered bargaining problems with asymmetric information are usually complex 
and give rise to multiple equilibria. We therefore make a few stylized assumptions 
that will allow us to keep the model tractable, even when we extend the analysis 
to multiple sequential transactions occurring among a large set of heterogeneously 
informed traders.
First, we assume that, in every transaction, the current holder of the asset makes 
an ultimatum offer to his counterparty. Focusing on ultimatum offers simplifies the 
analysis of equilibrium bidding strategies and is consistent with the characterization 
of  interdealer trading in financial markets by Viswanathan and Wang (2004, p. 3) 
as “very quick interactions.” Ultimatum offers are also consistent with how Duffie 
(2012, p. 2) describes the typical negotiation process in OTC markets and the notion 
that each OTC dealer tries to maintain “a reputation for standing firm on its original 
quotes.”
Second, we assume that prior to trading, the seller is uninformed about the reali-
zation of  v , whereas the buyer is an expert who knows  v . Note that for many finan-
cial products endowing a “buyer” with private information rather than the “seller” 
is an unrestrictive assumption; for example, a firm could be viewed as the buyer of 
an insurance policy, or, alternatively, as the seller of a risk exposure. Moreover, as 
will become clear later, it is a trader’s temptation to inefficiently screen his privately 
informed counterparty that moderately informed intermediaries may help  eliminate. 
2 In the context of financial markets, these gains to trade may originate from heterogeneous liquidity or hedging 
needs across traders. 
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This inefficient trading behavior could also arise under alternative information 
structures, for example, if the roles were reversed and an uninformed buyer made an 
ultimatum offer to a privately informed seller, or if both agents had their own private 
information about the asset. In an earlier draft available upon request (Glode and 
Opp 2015), we showed that our main results can survive in these alternative settings.
Third, agents know how well informed their counterparties are, that is, they know 
the distributions of other traders’ information about  v . Seppi (1990) lends support 
to this assumption arguing that agents knowing the identity of their trading counter-
parties is an important distinction between OTC trading and centralized/exchange 
trading.3
Finally, throughout the paper we also assume that in  knife-edge cases where a 
trader is indifferent between two actions, he picks the one that maximizes social 
surplus.
Together, these assumptions imply that the proposer in our bargaining game does 
not possess any superior information when making an offer to his counterparty. As a 
result, signaling concerns do not arise and we obtain a unique  subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium under direct trade. Moreover, our setting allows us to study a classic 
problem in economics where a monopolist seller inefficiently screens buyers based 
on their privately known types.
Analysis.—A  subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the direct trade game consists 
of a price that the seller quotes and an acceptance rule for each possible buyer type 
v that are mutual best responses in every subgame. If the seller quotes a price  p , 
the buyer accepts to buy the asset whenever  v ≥ p , which occurs with probability 
[1 − F (p) ] . Otherwise, the seller must retain the asset, which he values at  c (v) . We 
can write the seller’s expected payoff when quoting a price  p as
(5)  Π (p) ≡ [1 − F ( p) ] p + F ( p) E [c (v) | v < p] , 
where  E denotes the expectation operator. The change in the expected payoff from 
marginally increasing the price  p is then given by
(6)  Π′( p) =  [1 − F ( p) ] − f ( p) p + f  ( p) E [c (v)  | v < p] 
 + F ( p) ∂ _ ∂ p E [c (v)  | v < p] , 
which simplifies to
(7)  Π′( p) =  [1 − F ( p) ] − f  ( p) [ p − c ( p) ] . 
The first term on the  right-hand side of equation (7) represents the seller’s expected 
benefit from collecting a higher price when the buyer accepts the offer. The second 
3 Morris and Shin (2012) relax the  common-knowledge assumption in a bilateral trading setup similar to the 
one in this section and show how the resulting coordination problems can magnify the effect adverse selection has 
on trade efficiency. 
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term represents the expected cost from reducing the probability of trade and jeop-
ardizing trade surplus. The seller thus faces a  trade-off between his payoff when a 
sale occurs and the probability of a sale occurring, which is greatly influenced by 
the nature of his uncertainty about the buyer’s valuation. Ceteris paribus, greater 
belief dispersion, as reflected by lower values for the density  f ( · ) , implies that the 
seller finds it less costly to increase his price quote, strengthening his incentives to 
inefficiently screen the buyer.
It is useful to rewrite the seller’s marginal profit of increasing the price  p as 
follows:
(8)  Π′( p) =  [1 − F ( p) ] [1 − H ( p) ] , 
where we define the function
(9)  H (v) ≡  [ f  (v) _ 1 − F (v)]  [v − c (v)]   for v ∈ [ v L ,  v H ) 
to represent the ratio of the above-mentioned cost and benefit of marginally increas-
ing the price. The seller finds it optimal to quote a higher, less efficient price than 
p whenever  H ( p) < 1 . If on the other hand  H ( p) ≥ 1 , the benefit of collecting a 
higher price is dominated by the cost of reducing the acceptance probability.
We impose the following regularity condition on the function  H ( · ) to guarantee 
that the marginal profit function  Π′( · ) crosses zero from above at most in one point, 
which ensures that we obtain a unique  subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under 
direct trade:
ASSUMPTION 1:  H (v) is strictly increasing in  v for  v ∈ [ v L ,  v H ) .
Assumption 1 is closely related to the definition of a strictly regular environ-
ment by Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2015) as well as a standard assumption in auction 
theory that bidders’ virtual valuation functions are strictly increasing (Myerson 
1981). Moreover, when the gains to trade are independent of  v , that is, when 
v − c (v) = Δ > 0 , Assumption 1 simplifies to imposing that the hazard rate func-
tion  h (v) ≡ f  (v) / [1 − F (v) ] is strictly increasing. It is easy to verify that this last 
condition is satisfied by the uniform distribution and by a range of (truncated) 
parameterizations of the Normal distribution, the  chi-squared distribution, and the 
gamma distribution, to name only a few.
Socially efficient trade requires that the seller quotes a price that is accepted by 
the buyer with probability  1 . Since  f  (v) is strictly positive everywhere on the sup-
port  [ v L ,  v H ] , the maximum price that maintains efficient trade is  p =  v L . As a result, 
direct trade is efficient if and only if
(10)  Π′( v L ) ≤ 0, 
or equivalently
(11)  H ( v L ) ≥ 1. 
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Efficient trade may thus be sustained in our setting as long as the gains to trade 
[v − c (v) ] are high and the seller’s beliefs are sufficiently concentrated (i.e., the 
 density  f  (v) is high enough) at the lower bound of the support. In this paper we pri-
marily characterize the condition(s) required for efficient trade, which allows us to 
isolate the benefits of intermediation, even when considering arbitrary numbers of 
intermediaries (see Section III).4
II. Intermediated Trade
In this section, we consider the involvement of an intermediary who is moderately 
informed, in the sense that he receives an imperfect signal about  v , making him bet-
ter informed than the seller but less informed than the buyer. Specifically, we assume 
that the intermediary receives one of  N possible signal realizations, each associated 
with a conditional distribution  F i(v) for  v , where  i ∈ {1, 2, … , N } . The probability of 
collecting each signal  i is denoted by  π i > 0 . We also assume that  F i+1 ( · )  first-order 
stochastically dominates  F i ( · ) and we define the conditional upper and lower 
bounds  v _i ≡ inf {v ∈ [ v L ,  v H ] :  F i(v) > 0} and  _ v i ≡ sup {v ∈ [ v L ,  v H ] :  F i(v) < 1} . 
Just like the seller, this intermediary privately values the asset at  c (v) and thus can-
not help realize gains to trade unless he resells the asset to the buyer and thereby 
facilitates a more efficient allocation. Moreover, this intermediary does not bring 
new information to the table, as his information set is nested by that of the buyer. 
However, as we show below, intermediation by this moderately informed agent can 
improve the efficiency of trade. We consider a simple trading network in which 
the original seller can offer the asset only to the intermediary. If the intermediary 
purchases the asset he can offer to sell it to the buyer. As noted above, all offers are 
ultimatum offers. A  subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in this intermediated trade 
game consists of a sequence of prices and acceptance rules for all trader types that 
are mutual best responses in every subgame (including subgames that are off the 
equilibrium path).
To sustain efficient trade the intermediary has to quote prices that the buyer 
accepts with probability  1 . The intermediary must therefore find it optimal to quote 
p =  v _i to the buyer after receiving signal  i , since  v _i represents the buyer’s lowest 
possible valuation of the asset. A necessary condition for efficient trade is that a 
marginal deviation from this efficient price reduces the intermediary’s conditional 
expected payoff, that is,
(12)  Π i ′( v _i ) =  [1 −  F i( v _i ) ] [1 −  H i( v _i ) ] ≤ 0  for  i ∈ {1, 2, … , N} , 
where we define  H i(v) ≡  [  f i(v) _ 1 −  F i(v)]  [v − c (v)] on the domain  v ∈ [ v _i ,  _ v i ) . Moreover, 
if the functions  H i (v) are strictly increasing in  v on their respective domains, these 
N inequalities become sufficient conditions for efficient trade between the interme-
diary and the buyer.
4 See, e.g., d’Aspremont and  Gérard-Varet (1979); Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983); and Samuelson (1984) 
for general analyses of the conditions required to implement  first-best allocations under asymmetric information. 
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Since the available surplus from trade [ v − c (v) ] does not change with the involve-
ment of an intermediary, it is the shape of the  N conditional distributions  F i( · ) that dic-
tates whether efficient trade can be sustained with an intermediary. If for some signal  i 
the conditional density  f i ( · ) is sufficiently small at the conditional lower bound  v _i , then 
marginally increasing the price has so little impact on the probability of trade that the 
intermediary finds it optimal to deviate from the socially efficient price  v _i .5 However, 
if the intermediary’s signals concentrate posterior beliefs in specific regions of the 
unconditional support  [ v L ,  v H ] such that the conditional densities  f i ( · ) are sufficiently 
high at their respective lower bounds, then marginal deviations from the socially effi-
cient price are privately suboptimal for the intermediary. As the intermediary gets to 
know the buyer’s valuation with more precision, he has weaker incentives to ineffi-
ciently screen the buyer based on his private information and jeopardize gains to trade.
Efficient trade through the network also requires that the intermediary accepts the 
seller’s offer with probability  1 . Since stochastic dominance implies that  v _1 =  v L , 
the seller has to prefer quoting a price  p =  v L to the intermediary rather than higher 
prices that the intermediary accepts only after receiving any of the better signals 
i ≥ 2 . Provided that the conditions for efficient trade between the intermediary and 
the buyer are satisfied, the intermediary’s conditional valuation for the asset is given 
by the price he will quote to the buyer:  v _i .
Overall, the involvement of an intermediary leads to the replacement of the con-
dition for efficient trade under direct trade (i.e., equation (10)) by a set of  (N + 1) 
conditions that depend on the shapes of the conditional distributions  F i ( · ) . As we 
show below, partitions are a particular type of conditional distributions that strictly 
weakens the condition for efficient trade. In this regard, it is useful to establish the 
following Lemma (the proof is relegated to the online Appendix).
LEMMA 1: If Assumption 1 is satisfied under some distribution  F ( · ) , it is also sat-
isfied under any truncated version of that distribution.
Assumption 1 thus guarantees that the intermediary’s conditional marginal profit 
function  Π i ′ ( · ) also crosses zero from above at most in one point. This property 
ensures that we obtain a unique  subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under interme-
diated trade.6 We can now establish our first main result.
PROPOSITION 1: Let  Ω 1 (F ) and  Ω 0 (F ) denote the set of functions  c ( · ) associ-
ated with efficient trade with and without an intermediary, respectively, for a given 
CDF  F ( · ) , under Assumption 1. If the intermediary’s signal partitions the support 
of  v into  N ≥ 2 subintervals of strictly positive measure, then the set of functions 
c ( · ) associated with efficient trade is strictly larger with the intermediary, that 
is,  Ω 0 (F) ⊂  Ω 1 (F ) .
5 In particular, if the intermediary’s conditional distributions have full support, then involving this intermediary 
cannot eliminate all trade inefficiencies since generically for some signals the intermediary’s temptation to screen 
the buyer will be higher than the original seller’s. 
6 As under direct trade, a strictly increasing  H i( · ) function implies that the intermediary’s optimal price quote to 
the buyer is unique. By backward induction, the seller can anticipate the intermediary’s unique optimum response to 
any price quote, which implies a unique  subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (recall the  tie-breaking rule we imposed 
for  knife-edge cases where a trader is indifferent between two actions). 
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Proposition 1 shows that the involvement of an intermediary with a specific sig-
nal structure can facilitate efficient trade: if the intermediary’s information set par-
titions the interval  [ v L ,  v H ] into two or more subintervals, then intermediated trade is 
efficient for a strictly larger set of  c ( · ) functions than direct trade. This result can be 
intuitively understood by considering the  trade-off each potential holder of the asset 
faces when choosing a price to quote. When holding the asset, a trader’s expected 
surplus from quoting a price to his better informed counterparty is the difference 
between the total expected surplus from trade and the information rents that can be 
appropriated by all subsequent traders in the network.
As under direct trade, each potential proposer trades off the negative impact of 
quoting a higher price on the probability of trade, and thus trade surplus, against the 
benefit from appropriating a larger share of the whole surplus if trade is realized. 
The impact of a price increase on the probability of trade is in turn affected by his 
counterparty’s informational advantage, and therefore changes with the involvement 
of a moderately informed intermediary.
Since the intermediary is better informed about  v than the seller, the intermediary 
has lower incentives to inefficiently screen the buyer to reduce his information rents. 
In particular, as the intermediary’s posterior beliefs are concentrated in a subinter-
val of the unconditional support  [ v L ,  v H ] , the intermediary can quote prices above  v L 
without jeopardizing any gains to trade (whenever  i ≥ 2 ). However, given that the 
intermediary’s beliefs are concentrated in the  i th subinterval, any price increase 
beyond the conditional lower bound  v ¯i is penalized by a larger decline in the con-ditional probability of trade. In the limiting case where the intermediary’s partition 
becomes so fine that his information set is identical to the buyer’s, a small increase 
above the maximum efficient price implies that the conditional probability of trade 
drops from one to zero, making such an inefficient deviation unattractive.
Further, provided that the intermediary trades efficiently with the buyer, the seller 
may also be more inclined to trade efficiently with the intermediary. Intuitively, 
screening is less effective when facing the moderately informed intermediary 
instead of the fully informed buyer. Under direct trade, the seller can screen the 
buyer by directly choosing the marginal buyer type from the continuous set  [ v L ,  v H ] . 
In contrast, when facing an intermediary who plans to resell the asset at one of the 
lower bounds  v _i , the seller is effectively restricted to choosing the marginal buyer 
type from the discrete subset  { v L ,  v _2 , … ,  v _N } ; the seller’s beliefs about the intermedi-
ary’s valuation of the asset are concentrated at these  N valuations. It follows imme-
diately that if the seller optimally chooses the efficient price  v L under direct trade he 
will also do so under intermediated trade, since the set of his alternative choices is 
weakly inferior when facing the intermediary. Moreover, we show in the proof of 
Proposition 1 the existence of a set of functions  c ( · ) for which the seller chooses a 
marginally inefficient price, say  p ′ >  v L , under direct trade, but picks the efficient 
price  p =  v L when facing the intermediary and choosing from the set  { v L ,  v _2 , … ,  v _N } . 
Overshooting to a price of  v _2 is then inferior relative to  v L , as it brings about a sig-
nificant reduction in the probability of trade. The larger the overshooting vis à vis 
p′ —that is, the higher  v _2 —the less attractive is it for the seller to deviate from the 
efficient price  v L when facing an intermediary.
Intermediation adds a strategic agent who uses his information and market power 
to capture a share of the trade surplus. Thus, as discussed above, the seller  generally 
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faces an inferior opportunity set when facing the intermediary, and therefore, would 
prefer to bypass this trader and contact the buyer directly. Yet Proposition 1 shows 
that there always exist valuation functions  c ( · ) (that may depend on the type of 
assets being traded or the economic conditions at the time of the trade), for which 
this deviation would reduce the social efficiency of trade. A trading network achiev-
ing a higher social surplus then centers around a moderately informed intermediary 
and is sparse, in the sense that the seller cannot contact the buyer directly. In many 
decentralized markets, it is often impossible for retail or unsophisticated traders to 
contact the most sophisticated traders directly and bypass the usual middlemen. In 
fact, Li and Schürhoff (2014) estimate that for the municipal bond market only  2.4 
percent of all possible directed links are formed, highlighting that sparsity is an 
empirically plausible feature of our model. Moreover, we highlight in Section IV 
that ex ante transfers, such as payments for order flow, can play a beneficial role in 
ensuring that the socially efficient trading network is implemented in equilibrium.
It is important to note that although involving the described intermediaries 
expands the set of functions  c ( · ) for which efficient trade is sustained, it does not 
improve trade efficiency in all cases. When direct trade is inefficient the effect of 
intermediation generally depends on which buyer types are pooled by the interme-
diary’s signals. Consider the involvement of an intermediary who can trade effi-
ciently with the buyer and whose partition cutoff  v _2 is located just slightly above 
 p ′, the price that maximizes the seller’s expected payoff under direct trade. Facing 
the intermediary, the seller then might quote  p =  v _2 since it is the price closest to 
 p ′ within the set  { v L ,  v _2 , … ,  v _N } . However, since  v _2 > p ′, the expected surplus from 
trade shrinks with the involvement of this intermediary. In contrast, if the intermedi-
ary’s partition cutoff  v _2 is located slightly below  p ′, then quoting  p =  v _2 to the inter-
mediary increases the expected surplus from trade relative to direct trade, making 
intermediation socially beneficial.
So far, our discussion focused on cases where the intermediary and the buyer 
trade efficiently. However, when trade is expected to break down with positive prob-
ability between the intermediary and the buyer, the original seller benefits less from 
trading efficiently with the intermediary. In these cases, intermediation not only 
affects the sensitivity of the probability of trade to a price increase, as illustrated 
above, but also the expected trade surplus at stake. Problems of double marginal-
ization may then arise as two monopolists are sequentially trading the asset in an 
inefficient manner (Spengler 1950).
While involving intermediaries strictly expands the set of cases where efficient 
trade obtains, it may have ambiguous effects when trade remains inefficient. We 
show in the next section, however, that in those cases lengthening the chain by 
involving additional intermediaries may be sufficient to eliminate all inefficiencies.
III. Intermediation Chains
This section extends our earlier results and shows how long chains of interme-
diaries may sustain efficient trade in cases where shorter chains do not. In contrast 
to most models of intermediation where the optimal trading network is centered 
around a unique intermediary, our model sheds light on the prevalence of interme-
diation chains in many decentralized markets (Goldstein and Hotchkiss 2012; Bank 
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for International Settlements 2013; Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt 2014; Li and 
Schürhoff 2014; Di Maggio, Kermani, and Song 2015).
Suppose there are  M intermediaries, indexed by  m based on their position in a 
trading chain. To simplify the notation, we label the seller as trader  0 and the buyer 
as trader  M + 1 . Each intermediary  m observes a signal that partitions the domain 
[ v L ,  v H ] into subintervals. The mechanism that makes intermediation chains valuable 
in our model is an extension of that featured in Section II and is best highlighted by 
assuming that the information set intermediary  m has before trading is nested by the 
information set of intermediary  (m + 1) . That is, intermediary  (m + 1) observes a 
signal that creates a strictly finer conditional partition than intermediary  m ’s signal. 
Formally, we make the following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 2: If intermediary  m < M knows that  v ∈ [ v _ i m ,  _ v i m ) , then interme-
diary  (m + 1 ) ′ s information partitions  [ v _ i m ,  _ v i m ) into at least three subintervals of 
strictly positive measure.
Nesting sequential traders’ information sets in this fashion eliminates signaling 
concerns and implies a unique  subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in our model, 
despite the presence of  (M + 1) bargaining problems among  (M + 2) heteroge-
neously informed agents. In this game with multiple intermediaries, the definition 
of a  subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is the natural counterpart of the definition 
stated in Section II. Assuming that there are at least three subintervals that separate 
each pair of counterparties  m and  (m + 1) guarantees that we are able to insert a 
“moderately informed” intermediary between them, if needed. This particular struc-
ture will allow us to extend some of our earlier results and show that long interme-
diation chains can preserve the efficiency of trade in situations where surplus would 
be destroyed with fewer intermediaries. What ultimately contributes to sustaining 
efficient trade in equilibrium is that the chain reduces the informational distance 
between counterparties, although information sets would not necessarily have to be 
nested for our mechanism to work.7
The proposition below formalizes our main result regarding intermediation 
chains.
PROPOSITION 2: Let  Ω M (F ) denote the set of functions  c ( · ) associated with 
efficient trade in a chain of  M intermediaries with information sets satisfying 
Assumption 2 for a given CDF  F ( · ) , under Assumption 1. There exists a set of 
M ̃ ≥ 1 intermediaries who can be added to the chain such that the set of functions 
c ( · ) associated with efficient trade is strictly enlarged, that is,  Ω M (F ) ⊂  Ω M+ M ̃  (F ) .
As before, when holding the asset a proposer’s expected payoff from quoting a 
price is the difference between the total surplus from trade and the cumulative infor-
mation rents going to all subsequent traders in the chain. Each proposer trades off the 
negative impact of quoting a higher price on the probability of trade, and thus trade 
surplus, against the benefit from appropriating a larger share of the whole surplus 
7 In an earlier draft (Glode and Opp 2015), available upon request, we studied variants of our model with 
 non-nested information sets and obtained qualitatively similar results. 
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if trade is realized. If the responder has only a small informational advantage over 
the proposer, deviating from efficient trade by quoting aggressive prices imposes 
large reductions in the probability of trade. Yet, provided that trade is efficient in 
subsequent transactions, the surplus from trade that would be destroyed in each 
transaction by quoting aggressive prices is the same. When anticipating efficient 
trade in later transactions, strategies aimed at quoting inefficient prices to counter-
parties are thus discouraged in a long intermediation chain. Thus, by locating traders 
within a chain such that each trader’s information set is similar, but not identical, to 
those of his direct counterparties efficient trade can be facilitated. For example, in 
the context of OTC markets the least sophisticated dealer should trade directly with 
uninformed retail investors while the most sophisticated dealer should trade directly 
with the best hedge funds and trading desks on Wall Street. In a  nonfinancial con-
text, our results highlight the potential benefits of  multilayered distribution channels 
where local retailers quote prices to privately informed customers. Proposition 2 
also implies that, if the functions  c ( · ) and  F ( · ) are perturbed in ways that worsen 
the efficiency of trade in a given chain, a higher number of intermediaries may be 
needed to bridge the information asymmetries and sustain efficient trade, consistent 
with the empirical evidence from Li and Schürhoff (2014) and Di Maggio, Kermani, 
and Song (2015) discussed in our introduction.
Our results also highlight that the optimality of a trading network greatly depends 
on the trading frictions that are most relevant in a given context. When trade is 
impeded by inefficient screening of privately informed counterparties, our model 
shows that multiple heterogeneously informed intermediaries may improve the 
social efficiency of trade. When private information relates to traders’ past behav-
ior instead, Babus (2012) shows that optimal trading networks should be centered 
around a single intermediary who penalizes anyone defaulting on prior obligations 
(see also Farboodi 2014). Further, Gofman (2011) shows that in the presence of 
 noninformational bargaining frictions, socially efficient outcomes may be easier to 
achieve when networks are dense (although the relationship between density and 
efficiency is not always monotonic).8 In contrast, in our model a trading network 
needs to be sufficiently sparse to sustain efficient trade; otherwise, less informed 
parties have incentives to directly contact highly informed traders and inefficiently 
screen them. We discuss in the next section the role that payments for order flow 
can play in alleviating problems of this type. Given that some trading frictions are 
more relevant in some situations than in others, our results and those derived in the 
papers mentioned above can help us understand the types of networks we observe 
in different contexts.
Note also that the decentralized market structure we study is empirically prev-
alent and contrasts with alternative interventions that promote greater competition 
by centralizing traders’ interactions. In particular, if multiple informed traders were 
to bid simultaneously for the seller’s asset and a Crémer and McLean (1988)-type 
mechanism was allowed, the seller could use competition to effectively extract 
information from bidders. This competition effect is, however, absent in our setting 
where trade is bilateral and the asset moves through each trader sequentially. The 
8 See also Wright and Wong (2014) who study the impact of  non-informational bargaining and search frictions 
on trade in chains of intermediaries. 
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seller does not extract any information from competing bidders, but rather faces 
a single intermediary who is less informed than the ultimate buyer. This smaller 
information gap between the seller and his counterparty strengthens the seller’s 
incentives to quote an efficient price. Further, as highlighted by Biais, Martimort, 
and Rochet (2000), while moving from a monopolistic to an oligopolistic market 
structure may reduce incentives to inefficiently screen privately informed agents in 
the presence of adverse selection, it generally does not completely eliminate these 
inefficiencies. Hence, equilibrium trading volume under oligopolistic screening is 
below its socially optimal level, just as in the monopoly case. The intermediation 
chains we study feature decentralized, sequential trading among heterogeneously 
informed agents and are thus different from these alternative mechanisms.
IV. Implementation
So far, we have shown that intermediated trade can improve trade efficiency 
when traders have incentives to inefficiently screen their privately informed coun-
terparties. In this section, we consider a  network-formation game that precedes the 
trading game from Section III. We characterize  order-flow agreements that traders 
commit to ex ante, that is, before information is obtained and trading occurs. These 
 order-flow agreements ensure that no trader involved in an intermediation chain 
that sustains efficient trade will be tempted to form an alternative trading network. 
 Order-flow agreements can thus help implement socially optimal trading networks 
in our model, shedding light on potential downsides of recent proposals by regula-
tors and stock exchange officials to ban related practices in financial markets.9
DEFINITION 1: Consider an economy with a set of traders   . An  order-flow agree-
ment  Σ between a subset of traders   ⊆  specifies the following objects:
 (i) A collection of directed network links: each trader  m ∈  is exclusively con-
nected to a unique counterparty  m′ ∈ { \ m} to which trader  m quotes an 
ultimatum price whenever he wishes to sell.
 (ii) A collection of ex ante transfers between the traders in   .
A key component of these  order-flow agreements are ex ante transfers that incen-
tivize traders to commit to transacting with specific counterparties. In financial 
markets, these transfers may come in the form of explicit agreements involving 
cash payments for order flow or soft dollars, or they may be implicit arrange-
ments involving profitable IPO allocations or subsidies on the various other ser-
vices that intermediaries provide. In fact, there is ample empirical evidence that 
“perks” are commonly used by financial intermediaries to compensate traders for 
9 See, for example, the comments made by Jeffrey Sprecher (CEO of Intercontinental Exchange, which owns 
the New York Stock Exchange), reported in “ICE CEO Sprecher Wants Regulators to Look at ‘Maker-Taker’ 
Trading” by Christine Stebbins (Reuters.com, January 26, 2014); “Guidance on the Practice of ‘Payment for Order 
Flow,’” prepared by the Financial Services Authority (May 2012); and the comments made by Harvey Pitt (for-
mer Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman), reported in “Options Payment for Order Flow Ripped” by 
Isabelle Clary (Securities Technology Monitor, May 3, 2004). 
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their  business (see, e.g., Blume 1993; Chordia and Subrahmanyam 1995; Reuter 
2006; Nimalendran, Ritter, and Zhang 2007). Further, for many types of securities, 
 order-flow agreements are required to be disclosed in advance in Rule 606 reports. 
Thus, just like in our definition above, transfers linked to  order-flow agreements do 
not vary based on  transaction-specific information (i.e., a particular realization of  v ), 
but they may vary based on the expertise of the traders involved (as documented by 
Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara 1996). This characterization distinguishes these ex ante 
transfers from the transfers that occur ex post when transaction prices are paid as 
part of the trading process.
In the  network-formation game we consider, each trader’s payoff is the sum of 
these ex ante transfers and continuation payoffs that are consistent with the equilib-
rium outcome(s) of the trading game described in Section III. We define an equilib-
rium of this  network-formation game as follows.
DEFINITION 2: An  order-flow agreement  Σ between a set of traders   ⊆  consti-
tutes an equilibrium of the  network-formation game if there is no coalition of trad-
ers  ′ ⊆  that can block the agreement, that is, there does not exist an  order-flow 
agreement  Σ ′ that only includes traders in   ′ and that makes every trader in   ′ 
weakly better off and at least one trader in   ′ strictly better off.
Consistent with our previous analysis, we are interested in the cases for which 
intermediation chains help sustain efficient trade. As noted above, networks satis-
fying Assumption 2 have a unique equilibrium in the trading game and thus unique 
continuation payoffs for all traders. Below we characterize the existence of equi-
librium  order-flow agreements that support the type of intermediation chains we 
introduced in Section III (the proof is relegated to the online Appendix).
PROPOSITION 3: If the set   contains traders endowed with information sets con-
sistent with Assumption 2 who can form a chain that would sustain efficient trade in 
the trading game:
 (i) Any  order-flow agreement that would not sustain efficient trade is not an 
equilibrium in the  network-formation game.
 (ii) For any intermediation chain that would sustain efficient trade, there exists 
a corresponding  order-flow agreement that constitutes an equilibrium in the 
 network-formation game.
The result in Proposition 3 relies on the following logic. Suppose there exists 
an equilibrium in which the trading network is such that the equilibrium of the 
subsequent trading game is inefficient. Then, agents can create a new coalition that 
includes all traders that can sustain efficient trade and offer  ex ante transfers to all 
agents that were in the original network while also collecting the additional surplus 
that is available when trade is efficient. This set of agents thus constitutes a blocking 
coalition, a contradiction.
In our model,  deal-flow is valuable to intermediaries because they extract infor-
mation rents and thus obtain a fraction of the total surplus from trade  E [v − c (v) ] . 
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Intermediaries are willing to offer cash payments, or subsidized services, to the 
ultimate buyer and seller of the asset if these are required concessions for being 
involved in the trading network.
V. Conclusion
This paper shows that chains of moderately informed intermediaries may allevi-
ate trading inefficiencies associated with the screening of privately informed coun-
terparties by traders with market power. Layering trade over multiple sequential 
transactions that involve moderately informed intermediaries can weaken each trad-
er’s incentives to screen counterparties, and thereby increase the efficiency of trade. 
Greater information asymmetries may thus be better bridged by long intermediation 
chains in which each trader’s information set is similar, although not identical, to 
those of his direct counterparties. We note, however, that in cases where efficient 
trade is not achievable despite the presence of intermediaries, intermediation may 
sometimes make trade more fragile as problems of double marginalization can arise. 
A full characterization of the environments where heterogeneously informed inter-
mediaries either improve or worsen the efficiency of trade in markets with private 
information is left for future research.
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
We will first show that  Ω 0 (F) ⊆  Ω 1 (F) . Let  Ψ (F) denote the set of functions 
c ( · ) consistent with the regularity condition stated in Assumption 1 for a given CDF 
F ( · ) . We can thus characterize the set  Ω 0 (F) as
(A1)  Ω 0 (F) =  {c ∈ Ψ (F) :   Π ′ ( v L ) ≤ 0} . 
Trade between the Intermediary and the Buyer.—To show that 
c ∈  Ω 0 (F) ⇒ c ∈  Ω 1 (F) , we first show that the intermediary, when holding the 
asset, quotes a price that the buyer accepts with probability 1, provided that 
c ∈  Ω 0 (F) . If the intermediary receives a signal  i that implies that  v ∈ [ v _ i ,  _ v i ) , he 
chooses a price  p to maximize his conditional expected payoff:
(A2)  Π i ( p) =  [1 −  F i( p)] p +  F i( p) E [c (v)  | v < p, i] . 
By Lemma  1 ,  H i(v) is strictly increasing on  [ v _i ,  _ v i ) and a sufficient condition for 
efficient trade between the intermediary and the buyer is
(A3)  Π i ′( v _i ) =  [1 −  F i( v _i ) ] [1 −  H i( v _i ) ] ≤ 0. 
By definition, for all  c ∈  Ω 0 (F) we know that  Π ′ ( v L ) ≤ 0 , or equivalently, 
H ( v L ) ≥ 1 . We now show that  H i( v _i ) > H ( v L ) for all  i , which allows us to conclude 
that the intermediary quotes a socially efficient price, since  H ( v L ) ≥ 1 then implies 
that  H i( v _i ) > 1 and equivalently,  Π i ′( v _i ) < 0 , for all  i ∈ {1, … , N } .
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When  v _i >  v L we obtain the inequality
(A4)  H i( v _i ) =  [ f  ( v _i ) __________  F ( _ v i ) − F ( v _i )]  [ v _i − c ( v _i )] 
 ≥  [ f  ( v _i ) _______ 1 − F ( v _i )]  [ v _i − c ( v _i )] = H ( v _i ) > H ( v L ) , 
and when  
_ v i <  v H , we obtain
(A5)  H i( v _ i ) =  [ f  ( v _i ) __________  F ( _ v i ) − F ( v _i )]  [ v _i − c ( v _i )] 
 >  [ f  ( v _i ) _______ 1 − F ( v _i )]  [ v _i − c ( v _i )] = H ( v _i ) ≥ H ( v L ) . 
Trade between the Seller and the Intermediary.—Next, we show that the seller 
quotes the intermediary a price of  v L rather than any of the price candidates  v _i for 
i ∈ {2, 3, … , N + 1} , where we define  v _N + 1 ≡  v H . We can restrict our attention to 
this discrete set of price candidates, since any prices lying between these price can-
didates are strictly dominated: these intermediate prices imply the same probability 
of trade as the  next-higher price in the set, but a lower sales price. Thus, provided 
that the conditions for efficient trade between the intermediary and the buyer are 
satisfied, a sufficient condition for efficient trade between the seller and the inter-
mediary is
(A6)  v L ≥ [1 − F ( v _i ) ] v _i + F ( v _i ) E [c (v) | v <  v _i ] for i ∈ {2, … ,  N + 1} . 
At the cutoffs  v _i , we can use the function  Π ( p) introduced in equation (5) and 
rewrite equation (A6) as
(A7)  Π ( v _ i ) − Π ( v L ) ≤ 0 for i ∈ {2, … ,  N + 1} . 
This representation shows that, when facing the intermediary, the seller’s expected 
payoff is weakly lower than under direct trade: the discrete set of attainable expected 
payoffs  {Π ( v L ) , Π ( v 2 _) , … , Π ( v H ) } is a strict subset of the continuous set of expected 
payoffs attainable under direct trade,  {Π (v) } v∈[ v L ,  v H ] . It follows immediately that if 
the seller does not want to deviate from the efficient price  v L under direct trade he 
will not wish to do so under intermediated trade as well. To summarize, since we 
have shown that both the intermediary and the seller trade efficiently under interme-
diated trade whenever direct trade is efficient, it follows that  Ω 0 (F) ⊆  Ω 1 (F) .
It remains to be shown that  Ω 0 (F) ⊂  Ω 1 (F) , that is, there exist functions  c ( · ) 
such that  c ∈  Ω 1 (F) but  c ∉  Ω 0 (F) . We can write the seller’s expected payoff from 
deviating from the socially efficient price as follows:
(A8)  Π ( v _i ) − Π ( v L ) =  ∫  v L   v _i  Π ′ (z) dz .
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Since  Π ′ ( · ) crosses zero from above at most in one point on the support  [ v L ,  v H ] , 
it follows that  Π ′ ( v L ) ≤ 0 implies that  Π ( v _i ) − Π ( v L ) < 0 for all  i ≥ 2 . That is, 
when facing the intermediary, deviating from the efficient price makes the seller 
strictly worse off. The same property of  Π ′ ( · ) implies that if  Π ( v _2 ) − Π ( v L ) ≤ 0 
then  Π ( v _i ) − Π ( v L ) ≤ 0 for all  i ≥ 2 . We can therefore characterize the set  Ω 1 (F) 
as follows:
(A9)  Ω 1 (F) =  {c ∈ Ψ (F) :  Π ( v _2 ) − Π ( v L ) ≤ 0, { Π i ′( v _i ) ≤ 0}  ∀ i∈N } . 
By continuity of the set  Ψ (F) , there exists a subset of functions  c ∈  Ω 0 (F) for 
which the condition for efficient direct trade holds with equality, that is, where 
 Π ′ ( v L ) = 0 . Consider replacing any one of these functions  c (v) by a perturbed func-
tion  c ̃(v, ϵ) ≡ c (v) + ϵ , where  ϵ ≥ 0 is bounded from above to ensure that  c ̃(v, ϵ) 
still satisfies the regularity condition  v −  c ̃(v, ϵ) > 0 for all  v ∈ [ v L ,  v H ] . Define the 
overall slack across all efficiency conditions in the presence of the intermediary 
under such a function  c ̃(v, ϵ) as
(A10)  ρ ̃ (ϵ) ≡ − max   
 {Π ( v _2 ) − Π ( v L ) , { Π i ′( v _i ) } ∀ i∈N } . 
Note that all  Π i ′( v _i ) are continuous and strictly increasing in  ϵ and so is the difference Π ( v _2 ) − Π ( v L ) . Moreover, applying the maximum operator to a set of continuous 
and strictly increasing functions yields a continuous and strictly increasing function. 
Thus,  ρ ̃ (ϵ) is continuous and strictly decreasing in  ϵ .
We showed above that when the condition for efficient direct trade holds with 
equality ( Π ′ ( v L ) = 0 ) then, after introducing an intermediary, all conditions for effi-
cient trade hold with strict inequality, i.e.,  ρ ̃ (0) > 0 . By continuity of  ρ ̃ (ϵ) there 
exist strictly positive values for  ε such that  ρ ̃ (ϵ) ≥ 0 , implying that  c ̃(v, ϵ) ∈  Ω 1 (F) . 
Yet, since we started with a function  c (v) =  c ̃(v, 0) for which  Π ′ ( v L ) = 0 , these per-
turbed functions  c ̃(v, ϵ) will imply that  Π ′ ( v L ) > 0 such that  c ̃(v, ϵ) ∉  Ω 0 (F) . It thus 
follows that the set of functions  c (v) that satisfy efficient trade with the intermediary 
is strictly larger than the one without the intermediary, that is,  Ω 0 (F) ⊂  Ω 1 (F) . ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
The logic of this proof is similar to the one of Proposition 1. Yet the notation is 
more involved as we need to keep track of multiple layers of intermediation. In the 
following we will use the subscript  m to identify trader  m ’s information set. For 
example,  F m (v) is the CDF of  v given trader  m ’s information set,  E m [v] is the expec-
tation of  v given trader  m ’s information set, and
(A11)  Π m ( p) ≡  [1 −  F m ( p)] p +  F m (p) E m [c (v) | v < p] . 
If trader  m < M knows that  v ∈ [ v _ i m ,  _ v i m ) then trader  (m + 1) knows that 
v is in one of the  K (m + 1, i) ≥ 3  non-overlapping subintervals asso-
ciated with the boundaries  w j (m + 1, i) , where  v _ i m =  w 0 (m + 1, i) <  w 1 (m + 1, i) < ⋯ <  w K (m + 1, i) =  _ v i m . Thus,  w j (m + 1, i) denotes the  j th 
partition cutoff of trader  (m + 1) ’s information set if trader  m observes signal 
 i ∈  N m . For a given  F ( · ) and a given chain with  M intermediaries we define  Ω M (F) 
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as the set of functions  c ( · ) that satisfy all conditions for efficient trade along the 
chain:
(A12)  Ω M (F) = {c ∈ Ψ (F) : { Π M ′ ( v _ i M ) ≤ 0 } ∀ i∈ N M  , 
  { Π m ( w 1 (m + 1, i)) −  Π m ( w 0 (m + 1, i) ) ≤ 0 } ∀ i∈ N m  ∀ m < M} , 
where  Ψ (F) is defined as in the proof of Proposition 1. Also as in the proof of 
Proposition 1, in any transaction between  non-experts  (m < M) , we can focus on 
verifying the profitability of a trader  m ’s deviation from a marginal type  w 0 (m + 1, i) 
to the type  w 1 (m + 1, i) due to the fact that  Π m ′ (v) crosses zero from above at most 
once (in one point).
By continuity of the set  Ψ (F) , there exist functions  c ∈  Ω M (F) such that for some 
transaction between traders  m and  (m + 1) the condition for efficient trade holds 
with equality after some signal  i , that is, either:
(A13)  Π m ( w 1 (m + 1, i) ) −  Π m ( w 0 (m + 1, i) ) = 0  if  m < M 
or
(A14)  Π M ′ ( v _ i M )  = 0  if  m = M. 
We will show next that the conditions for efficient trade hold with strict 
inequality if we introduce a particular intermediary  m ̃ between these two 
traders  m and  (m + 1) . This intermediary  m ̃ knows that  v is in one of 
 K ̃ ∈ {2, … , K (m + 1, i) − 1}  non-overlapping subintervals associated with the 
boundaries  w ̃ i , where  v _ i m =  w 0 (m + 1, i) =  w ̃ 0 <  w ̃ 1 < ⋯ <  w ̃  K ̃ =  w K (m + 1, i) =  _ v i m . Moreover, if  m < M , these boundaries are assumed to satisfy 
 w ̃ i ∈ { w 2 (m + 1, i) , … ,  w K (m + 1, i) } for all  i ∈ {1, 2, … ,  K ̃ } . Trader  m ̃ ’s partition 
is thus a strict refinement of trader  m ’s partition, and trader  (m + 1) ’s partition is a 
strict refinement of trader  m ̃ ’s partition. Going forward, we analyze a generic trans-
action in the chain characterized by the tuple  (i, m) , and, for notational simplicity, 
will simply write  w j when referring to  w j (m + 1, i) .
Trade between Intermediary  m ̃ and Trader  (m + 1) if  m < M .—Trader  m ̃ 
observes that  v ∈ [ w ̃ j ,  w ̃ j + 1 ) , where  j ∈ {0, 1, … ,   K ̃ − 1} . First, consider the case 
where the intermediary  m ̃ ’s signal implies that  w ̃ j >  w 0 . Analogously to arguments 
in the proof of Proposition 1,  Π m ( w 1 ) −  Π m ( w 0 ) = 0 implies that  Π m ′ ( w 1 ) < 0 and 
equivalently,  H m ( w 1 ) > 1 . Further, since  H  m ̃  (v) ≥  H m (v) it follows that  H  m ̃  (v) > 1 
for all  v >  w 1 . Thus, when  w ̃ j ≥  w 1 , the condition for efficient trade between traders 
m ̃ and  (m + 1) holds with strict inequality since
(A15)  Π  m ̃  ( w k ) −  Π  m ̃  ( w ̃ j ) =  ∫  w ̃ j   w k  [1 −  F  m ̃  (z) ] [1 −  H  m ̃  (z) ] dz < 0, 
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where we define  k = min {s ∈ {1, 2, … , K (m + 1, i) } :  w s >  w ̃ j } . As for the case 
where  w ̃ j =  w 0 , we can write
(A16)  Π  m ̃  ( w 1 ) −  Π  m ̃  ( w 0 ) =  ∫  w 0   w 1  [1 −  F  m ̃  (z) ] [1 −  H  m ̃  (z) ] dz
 =  ∫  w 0   w 1  [  F m ( w ̃ 1 ) −  F m (z)  ____________ F m ( w ̃ 1 ) −  F m ( w 0 ) ]  [1 −  (  f m (z) ___________   F m ( w ̃ 1 ) −  F m (z))  (z − c (z)) ] dz
  =  
 ∫  w 0   w 1  [1 −  F m (z) ] [  F m ( w ̃ 1 ) −  F m (z) _1 −  F m (z) −  (  f m (z) _ 1 −  F m (z))  (z − c (z)) ] dz
     ________________________________________    F m ( w ̃ 1 ) −  F m ( w 0 ) 
 =  
 ∫  w 0   w 1  [1 −  F m (z) ] [1 −  H m (z) −  1 −  F m ( w ̃ 1 ) _1 −  F m (z) ] dz    _______________________________ F m ( w ̃ 1 ) −  F m ( w 0 ) 
 =  
 Π m ( w 1 ) −  Π m ( w 0 ) −  ∫  w 0   w 1  [1 −  F m (z) ] [ 1 −  F m ( w ̃ 1 ) _1 −  F m (z) ] dz    ____________________________________  F m ( w ̃ 1 ) −  F m ( w 0 ) , 
which means that  Π m ( w 1 ) −  Π m ( w 0 ) = 0  ⇒  Π  m ̃  ( w k ) −  Π  m ̃  ( w ̃ 0 ) < 0 , since
(A17)  −  
 ∫  w 0   w 1  [1 −  F m (z) ] [ 1 −  F m ( w ̃ 1 ) _1 −  F m (z) ] dz   _____________________   F m ( w ̃ 1 ) −  F m ( w 0 ) < 0. 
Trade between Intermediary  m ̃ and Trader  (m + 1) if  m = M .—When trader 
(m + 1) is the expert buyer ( M + 1 ), the condition for efficient trade is given by
(A18)  Π  m ̃  ′ ( w ̃ j ) =  [1 −  F  m ̃  ( w ̃ j ) ] [1 −  H  m ̃  ( w ̃ j ) ] ≤ 0  ∀ j ≥ 0. 
We want to show that this condition is satisfied with strict inequality when-
ever  Π m ′ ( w 0 ) = 0 . In that case, we know that  H m ( w 0 ) = 1 , which, according 
to the derivations above, implies that  H  m ̃  ( w 0 ) > 1 and  H  m ̃  ( w ̃ j ) > 1 for all  j ≥ 0 . 
Thus,  Π m ′ ( w 0 ) = 0  ⇒  Π  m ̃  ′ ( w ̃ j ) < 0 for all  j ≥ 0 .
Trade between Trader  m and Intermediary  m ̃ .—Trader  m quotes a socially effi-
cient price to trader  m ̃ when
(A19)  Π m ( w ̃ 1 ) −  Π m ( w 0 ) < 0. 
If  m < M , that is, trader  (m + 1) is not the expert buyer, then we know that 
 w ̃ 1 >  w 1 and we can rewrite this condition as
(A20)  Π m ( w 1 ) −  Π m ( w 0 ) +  ∫  w 1   w ̃ 1  Π m ′ (z) dz < 0. 
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If trader  (m + 1) is the expert buyer and  Π m ′ ( w 0 ) = 0 , then we also know 
that  Π m ′ (w) < 0 for  w >  w 0 , and thus  Π m ( w ̃ 1 ) −  Π m ( w 0 ) < 0 .
Adding  M ̃ ≥ 1 Intermediaries to the Chain.— Suppose that for a given function 
c ( · ) and a chain with  M intermediaries, there are  M ̃ transaction(s) in the chain 
where a condition for efficient trade holds with equality (for at least one possible 
signal). The derivations above imply that introducing  M ̃ new traders, with informa-
tion sets that satisfy the conditions described above, to intermediate these  M ̃ transac-
tions ensures that all conditions in the chain with  (M +  M ̃ ) intermediaries hold with 
strict inequality. Now, consider replacing any one of these functions  c (v) by a per-
turbed function  c ̃(v, ϵ) ≡ c (v) + ϵ , where  ε ≥ 0 is bounded from above to ensure 
that  v −  c ̃(v, ϵ) > 0 for all  v ∈ [ v L ,  v H ] . We can define the overall slack across all 
efficiency conditions in the new chain with  (M +  M ̃ ) intermediaries under the func-
tion  c ̃(v, ϵ) as  ρ ̃ (ϵ) and use the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1 to show 
that  Ω M (F) ⊂  Ω M +  M ̃  (F) . ∎
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